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Imperialist and anti-imperialist movements inevitably engendered 
their own stereotyped images, heros and villains, slogans and cliches. Im-
perialists took pride in a purported unity of effort which extended from 
their metropolitan ranks to the colonies where brave military men, enlight-
ened administrators, selfless missionaries, dynamic entrepreneurs and de-
dicated settlers either defended themselves against barbarous savages or 
endeavoured to civilize recalcitrant natives. Anti-imperialists, reversing the 
images, have exalted the heroic freedom fighters who led the struggles of 
the courageous and generous masses against rapacious colonialists. Such 
images, however radical their opposition, do not survive unless they con-
tain some elements of truth. But these very elements of truth, along with 
opposed ideological convictions, have allowed too many historians to mis~ 
take rhetoric for reality and, consequently, to overlook the complexity of 
the imperial experience. One should be able to recognize, for example, that 
imperialism spawned an extraordinary amount of human suffering without 
falling back, in blame or praise, on the image, even within a single national 
context, of a unified imperialist community. The different groups which 
composed such a community certainly shared a common stake in the domi-
nation of other peoples, but they were fully capable of working at cross.: 
purposes, of disparaging each other's motives, and, indeed, of hating each 
other intensely. Such at least appears to be the lesson to be derived from 
the case of the French colonization effort in Tonkin before 1914. 
Reflecting on his experience as Governor General of Indochina, Paul 
Doumer boasted that he had refused to read the local press. 1 Whatever 
one's view of Doumer and the fiscal burden he bequeathed to the colony, 
that decision should arouse some sympathy. Though it may be natural for 
administrators, colonial and otherwise, to dislike journalistic criticism of 
their doings , the French newspapers of Indochina do not make for plea-
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sant reading: they carried racist aspersions on the indigenous peoples, im-
practical suggestions designed to forward the interests of their readers, and 
castigations, justified or not, of metropolitan and colonial policies and per-
sonalities. 2 The Avenir du Tonkin carried these tendencies farthest. It 
spoke for Tonkin's colons. Owned and managed by men with personal 
stakes in colonial agricultural development, the Avenir du Tonkin drew 
upon the services of colon contributors and found its most attentive 
audience in the ranks of the colons. Ranging in tone from peevish queru-
lousness to vitriolic hysteria, it reflected the enormous frustration en-
gendered by the relative failure of the effort at agrarian colonization in 
Tonkin. No group, aside from that of the colons, escaped its shafts. Its 
depiction of the Vietnamese deserves separate treatment. This article will 
be concerned with its treatment of other segments of the imperialist com-
munity. Governors General, colonial bureaucrats and magistrates, metro-
politan imperialists, all came under attack. The onslaught intensified 
whenever one of its targets dared to reply and whenever someone had the 
temerity to criticize the colons themselves. At one in a determination to 
retain and to exploit Tonkin, the French imperialist community fragmented 
when it came to the question of how best to accomplish these goals. A 
survey of the contents of the Avenir du Tonkin, remarkably consistent 
despite several changes in management, sheds light on the lines of fracture 
within that community, suggests that imperial failure, quite as much as 
imperial success, can breed vice, and poses questions about the pathology 
of a group willing to identify its members with the persecuted Christ. 3 
Unlike Christ, however, the colons never believed in turning the other 
cheek, and they were in a position to make life more difficult for their 
fellow imperialists. 
The Avenir du Tonkin functioned as the protectorate's Journal Offi-
ciel until 1889, and in this early phase of its life carried items like the lyr-
ics of a "Chant national compose par les mandarins et les hommes du 
peuple tonkinois en honneur de M. Parreau, Resident general en Annam et 
au Tonkin:" 
Powerful country of France, 
You produce intelligent men. 
The Spirit of War is your strength. 
2 Some grasp of the temper of the Indochinese press can be obtained from 
the "Revue des journaux" section of the Revue lndo-Chinoise. In 1904 this journal chan-
ged to a more scholarly format and, while increasing in value as a source for the more 
profound French analyses of the societies of Indochina, lost value as a source for the 
more immediate and cruder expressions of colonial opinion. 
3 For the Christ reference, see Henri LAUMONIER, "Non Sens," Avenir du 
Tonkin, 12 February 1905, p. I. Unfortunately, the copy of the Avenir du Tonkin mi-
crofilmed at Paris' Bibliotheque Nationale has a gap between II April 1907 and 21 January 
1910. Though it would be of interest to have colon reactions to events like the 1908 
attempt at poisoning the Hanoi garrison, these events do not seem to have affected subs-
tantially attitudes already formed. The gap would have been a more serious obstacle 
to the argument presented here if the reformist policies growing out of the Russo-
Japanese War had not withered in face of events like the 1908 incident. The gap, how-
ever, has affected the structure of the article in one fashion: a discussion of the atti-
tudes of private metropolitan interests has been introduced between the treatments of 
political developments in France. 
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To a high degree, you possess the art of governing peoples. 
To our weak country, fallen into decadence, 
You give your powerful support in saving it from fatal ruin. 4 
But once the A venir du Tonkin had ceased to perform official functions, 
praise for administrators vanished from its pages. Convinced that they 
possessed "the art of governing peoples," the colons denied the same 
"art" to the administration. Indeed, a hatred of bureaucracy soon took 
root among the colons. It sprang from troubles on the land: for a variety 
of reasons in each case, the plantations of Cochinchina flourished, while 
those of Tonkin stagnated. 5 Hardly inclined towards self-criticism, Ton-
kin's colons blamed the administration for failing to aid their agricultural 
endeavours. Their attacks on the administration in this regard actually had 
scant justification: it distributed a sizeable amount of land to them, set 
up a labor code aimed at the control of rural proletarians, and ignored the 
innumerable colon violations of the decrees governing land, labor and fis-
cal policies. With the impact of the Russo-Japanese War, the administra-
tion did shift to a somewhat more rigourous line in its dealings with the 
colons, but even then it backed away from the idea of easing tensions with 
the Vietnamese through the repurchase of lands conceded to the colons 
and, on the whole, continued to dream of the development of a more heal-
thy plantation economy dominated by French nationals. But the adminis-
tration had to set some limits on the more exaggerated of colon claims. 
The continued tranquillity of an area where "pacification" re$ted on a fra-
gile base required such a course of action. The political stake in effec-
tive control, as well has the centralizing tendencies embedded in the French 
bureaucratic tradition and the administrators' sense of belonging to a cor-
porate body with rights and privileges of its own, dictated a refusal to en-
tertain the colons' demand that they be regarded as the "intermediaries" 
between the colonial government and the indigenous peoples of Tonkin. 6 
The colons responded to this denial of their claims to a quasi-feudal status 
with vituperation directed against the Governors General, the lesser ad-
ministrative personnel and specific bureaucratic policies. 
Colon reaction to Governors General tended to move through a fixed 
cycle: inquisitive interest in a new appointee, a warm welcome for him, 
supplications, increasingly critical remarks, bitter attacks, and, after his de-
parture, a nostalgia for the days of his rule as the same pattern unfolded 
with his successors. Looking back with regret to the once abused Jean-
4 
"Chant national compose par les mandarins et les hommes du peuple ton-
kinois en l'honneur de M. Parreau, Resident general en Annam et au Tonkin," ibid., 
I September 1888, p. 6. , 
5 In 1914 one hundred and forty-nine planters qualified as electors for the Chamber 
of Agriculture of Tonkin and Northern Annam. In the same year Europeans held 136,096 
hectares of concession land in Tonkin, with very little of it in cultivation. "Liste des 
electeurs de Ia Chambre d'agriculture du Tonkin et du Nord Annam," Journal Officiel 
de /'Jndochine, 13 April 1914, pp. 597-600; Henri BRENIER, Essai d'atlas statistique 
de 1'/ndochine fram;:aise. lndochine physique - Population -Administration - Finances 
- Agriculture - Commerce - /ndustriek(Hanoi-Haiphong: lmprimerie d'Extreme-
Orient, 1914), p. 197. 
6 Henri LAUMONIER, "L'Erreur Initiale," Avenir du Tonkin, 20 April 1905, p. I. 
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Louis de Lanessan (June 1891 -December 1894), the colons extended no 
sympathy to his successor, Armand Rousseau (March 1895 - December 
1896): "We will rob nobody of illusions by remarking that a government 
does not exist in Indochina at.the moment, though we have a Governor." 7 
Lanessan, at least in retrospect, possessed the merit of having roused bu-
reaucratic ire by favoring the colons. 8 But Rousseau looked better when 
compared with Paul Doumer (February 1897 -March 1902). 9 Doumer, a 
pivotal figure in the colonial development of Indochina, · constituted some-
thing of a special case. The colons recognized that his appointment lay in 
the desire of metropolitan political circles to rid France of him, and they 
feared that, given his political importance, any clash between Doumer and 
the Minister of Colonies would harm Indochina 10 But a new appointment 
always raised colon hopes, and in a passing moment of euphoria they de-
cided: "We have had educators, financiers, diplomats, engineers, etc ... we 
finally have an agriculturalist." 11 The honeymoon lasted about a year. The 
colons then discovered that they disliked Doumer's review of concession 
policy. 12 His program of indirect taxes and monopolies roused even more 
bitter complaints. This Governor General, moreover, had not bothered to 
disguise his distaste for the local press. 13 The memory of his rule went a 
long way to blunt criticism of his successor, Paul Beau (October 1902 -
February 1908), but eventually a colon did make the inevitable unfavora-
ble comparison with Doumer. 14 
It still took the rule of Albert 'Sarraut (November 1911 -November 
1913), seen by the colons as the representative of a totally misguided colo-
nial reformist movement in France, to revive much real affection for Dou-
mer. 15 Sarraut's efforts to introduce some degree of reform in Indochina 
provoked an altogether remarkable threat from the Avenir du Tonkin: 
... as is written in the republican catechism, when the law is transformed into 
an instrument of oppression, revolt becomes the most sacred of duties. 
But, short of a general revolt, it will always be possible for a citizen ruin-
ed by governmental autocracy to introduce onto the scene citizen Browning, 
as the editors of La· Guerre Sociale put it. 16 
Clumsy irony lay behind the threat, for its author was a royalist, little ena-
moured of republican catechisms and certainly more given to reading L'Ac-
tion fran(;aise than La Guerre Sociale. In speaking of general revolt and 
assassination, even in crude jest, the Avenir du Tonkin had ventured into 
7 
"La Politique de M. de Lanessan," ibid., I April 1893, p. I; "Ostracisme," 
ibid., 3 May 1893, p. I ; Paul DE VAREILLES, "Anarchie gouvernementale," ibid., 10 
June 18%, p. I. 
8 KtM, "Pas entete du tout," ibid., 27 June 1896, p. I. 
• C.B., "Gouverneur Benoiton," ibid., 7 May 1898, p. I. 
10 VIDEO, "Apprehensions," ibid., 6 February 1897, p. I. 
11 Jacques MoRRAS, "Un horoscope," ibid., 3 March 1897, pp. 1-2, p. 2. 
12 C.B., "Les Concessions agricoles," ibid., 2 April 1898, p. I; C.B., "La 
Commission des Concessions," ibid., 6 April 1898, p. I. 
13 C. B., "Presse et Gouverneur," ibid. , 6 July 1898, p. I. 
14 C.B., "Lettres d'un Colon," ibid., 6 December 1906, p. 2. 
1 ~ Henri LAUMONIER, "Vers le pouvoir absolu," ibid., 10 October 1912, p. I. 
16 Ibid . 
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treacherous waters, and, recognizing the dangers, began to repair its rela-
tions with Sarraut even before the Vietnamese assassination of two French 
officers in Hanoi in 1913 drove home the folly of thoughtless references 
to violence. 17 
Like the Governors General, the more minor administrative personnel 
came and went with some frequency. The colons complained of this end-
less circulation of administrators, but whereas they had to take into consid-
eration the personalities and larger policies of the imperial proconsuls, 
they could content themselves with a static portrayal of the bureaucrats in 
their demonology. 18 Seen from the colon perspective, the sins of thefonc-
tionnaires were many. They distrusted the colons and interfered with the 
colonization effort. 19 They put the interests of the natives ahead of those 
of the colons. 20 They dared to portray themselves as the friends of the na-
tives and to paint the colons as the enemies of the Vietnamese. In France 
the administrators attacked the colon as "an exploiter of the native, never 
satisfied and ill-humoured, a wrecker." 22 In Tonkin these "minor feudal 
magnates, vomited into our possessions by the Ecole Coloniale," tried to 
deny the colon the most elementary rights. 23 
Such sentiments, all too obviously tied to the colons' private inter-
ests, threatened to be self-defeating when taken in and of themselves. 
Colon publicists, consequently, cast their nets farther afield. They 
17 Henri LAUMON1ER, "Principes de colonisation," ibid., 8 January 1913, p. I. 
18 
"Le Sejour Colonial," ibid., 10 November 1900, p. I. The bureaucrats sub-
jected to colon attacks usually remained nameless, but the case of Host Van Vollenhoven, 
who served as Sarraut's Secretary General, constituted an exception. The colons at-
tacked him on a variety of grounds : his non-French birth, his name which " smelled a 
little of cocoa," his youth, his education at the Ecole coloniale, his service as a Minister 
of Colonies' chef de cabinet, his symbolizing the intrusion of African specialists into 
the Indochinese administration, and his alleged status as "the protege of M. Clementel, 
of the Temps and of international banking." In pursuing the unsuccessful campaign 
against him, the Avenir du Tonkin sought, for reasons to be discussed below, to find 
common ground with the bureaucrats on the scene who might be expected to resent the 
new appointee. "Le nouveau secretaire general de l'Indochine," ibid., 3 July 1912, p. 2; 
Henri LAUMON1ER, "Tous Heros," ibid., 6 July 1912, p. I. 
19 Ch. REMERY, "A Ia Chambre d'Agriculture," ibid., 5 August 1896, pp. 1-2; 
FucK, "John Drunkard and Co, Planteurs au Tonkin," ibid. , 27 July 1898, p. I; "Re-
sidents et Colons," ibid., 31 August 1899, p. I; X.X.X., "Colons et Fonctionnaires (Ire 
article)," ibid 17-18 July 1905, p. I; X.X.X., "Colons et Fonctionnaires (2e article)," 
ibid., Henri MoB, "Dossiers Secrets," ibid., 16 May 1906, p. I; Louis BoNNAFONT, 
"L'Administration en Indochine (II)," ibid., I August 1912, p. I. 
20 Louis BONNAFONT, "Lettre Ouvert a M. Clementel , Ministre des Colonies," 
ibid ., 4 May 1905, p. I. 
21 Paul XEM , "Curieux Pays.," ibid., 19-20 March 1906, p. I. 
22 Henri LAUMON1ER, "Courrier de Hanoi," ibid., 23 February, 1907, p. I. 
23 MATGIOI , "Aidons nous Ies uns Ies autres," ibid., 8 March 1907, p. I. Attacking 
the Ecole coloniale earlier. the colons had ranged themselves behind demands in Lyon and 
Marseille for the creation of provincially based colonial schools designed to serve the needs 
of different segments of the empire. The passage of time did not temper their hostility to 
the Parisian school: one of their publicists remarked in 1907 : "One harvests as one sows, 
one has sown the Ecole Coloniale. one has harvested nullities." "Une Ecole d' Administra-
teurs," ibid .. 22 December 1898. p. I; MATG101, "Le Faisceau," ibid .• 19 January 1907. 
p. I; "Enseignement pratique colonial." ibid .. 21-22 August 1911. p. I. 
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charged the bureaucrats with simple incompetence: "It is well known to-
day that the administrators, or residents, ignorant of native affairs and the 
VietnaJ;Dese language, are absolutely incapable of governing a province.'' 24 
Victims of routine, an obsessive interest in minutiae and secure employ-
ment, the bureaucrats, in the colons' view, hardly led a real life, for such 
a life primarily involved combat. 25 The administrators, moreover, had an 
unfortunate tendency to multiply, and the colons feared that the French 
colonies would come to resemble those "South American Republics where 
there are as many officers as soldiers.'' 26 Pursuing this line of attack, one 
of their spokesmen outlined a primitive form of Parkinson's Law: "Once 
upon a time one said that everytime there is a function, there is afonction-
naire ; today one might say: everytime there is a function, there are ten 
fonctionnaires, and everytime there are fonctionnaires without functions, 
one creates functions.'' 27 Though such criticism was often justified, the 
picture of the average bureaucrat which emerged from it ended in carica-
ture: he remained featureless, aside from his many vices, the most notable 
being his tendency to persecute hardworking and patriotic colons who 
knew much better than he how to handle the subject populations. 
The colons made a better case in attacking specific administrative pol-
icies. Any policy which diverted attention away from agriculture roused 
their ire. Here they could pursue their own interests while making claims 
on behalf of the Vietnamese. Complaining in 18% that no portion of a re-
cent government loan had gone into agricultural development, they pointed 
to the current famine in Tonkin as evidence that the administration had 
done nothing for the mass of the native population. 28 Tl.te major loan se-
cured by Doumer in 1898 did not impress them: 
What matters the natives dead of famine? The ruined colons? The bu-
reaucrats whose advancement has been delayed? The speculation on the pias-
tre? Life costlier for all? The merchants and industrialists without business? 
The colonization of Tonkin stationary for two years? What matters any of this 
since M. Doumer has returned with the funds? 29 
Doumer's railways should be reserved for the future, and money should be 
invested in irrigation and other works of immediate usefulness. 30 The ad-
ministration's failure to provide adequately for irrigation continued to dis-
turb them. 31 In 1906 a colon spokesman flatly charged that nothing had 
been done for agriculture during the twenty years since the conquest. 32 
24 C.B., "Mandarins and Residents," ibid., 5 December 1896, p. 2. 
2S "Les Cahiers coloniaux," ibid ., 22 March 1900, p. I; B., "La vie assuree," 
2 April 1900, p. I. 
2• Henri LAUMONIER, "Les Favoris," ibid 6 January 1906, p. I. 
27 Henri MoB, "Nos Fonctionnaires," ibid., 18 February 1906, p. I. 
28 VIDEO, "Et I' Agriculture," ibid., 14 March 1896, p. I; VIDEO, "La Famine 
au Tonkin," ibid., 22 April 1896, p. I. 
29 M.N ., "De Ia Colonisation (3e article)," ibid., 10 November 1898, p. I. 
3° Paul DE V AREILLES, "Lacunes de l'emprunt," ibid., 5-6 December 1898, p. I. 
3! Henri LAUMONIER, "Irrigation," ibid. , 6 August 1905, p. I. 
32 VtATOR, "Ressaissons-nous," ibid., 15 March 1906, p. I. 
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The colons also bitterly attacked the tax burden imposed upon the 
Vietnamese. In 1896 the Avenir du Tonkin castigated the administration for 
not remitting taxes in famine-struck Bac Giang province and for compound-
ing this mistake by arresting' "the canton chiefs, the mayors and the nota-
bles of these unfortunate villages. " 33. Doumer's regressive fiscal program 
infuriated the colons. They charged him with bleeding Tonkin white . 34 
But the confirmation of their dire prophecies about the program brought 
some twisted comfort: the colons' while expressing regrets and concern, 
found a certain grim satisfaction when a clash between agents of the alco-
hol monopoly and villagers left three Vietnamese dead. 35 The onslaught on 
the taxes and monopolies hardly slackened with the passage of time. 36 
Just as in the case of the administrative failure to do more for agriculture, 
the attacks upon the fiscal policies could be justified in objective terms. 
But here too self-interest entered the picture. The colons worried ·about the 
threat to security posed by the tax burden. 37 Moreover, they also found in 
this issue an opportunity to present themselves as the defenders of the 
Vietnamese, whom they often maligned in other contexts ; against a blund-
ering and rapacious bureaucracy. 38 
This role fitted neatly into the colon self-image. At its most metaphor-
ical the vision of self took the following form: " ... living in the bush, in 
the midst of the natives, he resembles ... one of the great and robust oaks 
of France, transplanted here , on a foreign soil, in the midst of a forest of 
bamboo; he dominates the scene, he sees what happens near and far, 
and , if he dres not always have the freedom to say what he thinks, he is al-
ways free to think of what he sees." 39 From the colon perspective, here 
lay a major cause of the difficulties with the administrators: 
By the very fact that he dominates the scene, he troubles some ; one dres 
not dare, however, to cut him down, and he always remains upright , proudly 
raised above the bamboo, braving squalls and tempests which still do not pre-
vent him from seeing what gres on. He sees in particular the bl1omboo forest.. . 
bend under the rain of vexations and continual injustices, which destroys some 
bamboo. These are the natives succumbing under the enormous weight of bad-
ly collected and badly divided taxes, and of arbitrary corvees, without speaking 
of the multiple other charges. 40 · 
But despite all the metaphorical strength, impotence could not be dis-
avowed: 
In their distress the natives appeal to the colon , who witnesses their suf-
fering , who understands them, who wishes to succour them, appeal to him to 
vindicate their just claims and to render them justice. But he cannot do it . He 
has no influence with the powers that be and remains a simple spectator of the 
33 "Rigeurs incomprehensibles," ibid., 2 May 1896, p. I. 
34 SIMPLEX, " Et apres Ia saignee blanc???," ibid., 3 August 1898, p. I. 
JS " Les monopoles de M. Doumer," ibid., p. I. 
36 Louis BONNAFONT, ibid., 4 May 1905, p. I; VIATOR, "Bilan," ibid., 25-26 
September 1905 , p. I ; Paul XEM, "Encore I'Imp6t," ibid., I April 1906, p. I. 
37 VIATOR, ibid. , 15 March 1906, p. I. 
38 Henri LAUMONIER, "La Douane," ibid., 29 October 1905, p. I ; VIATOR, ibid., 
15 March 1906, p. I. 
39 Rusncus, " L'reil du colon," ibid ., 30 July 1905, p. I. Emphasis in original. 
40 Ibid . 
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war waged on the yellows by the whites. The only right of the colon is summed 
up in a single word : to see , to see the misery and the discontent of the peo-
ple growing daily while waiting to witness revolt. Then he will see many other 
things . He will see himself attacked by everybody simultaneously and accused of 
having exasperated the people by his inhuman deeds and of being the cause of 
the revolt. Such is the lot of the colon . 4 1 
99 
The imagery, wooden in more than one respect, conveys something of co-
lon frustration , but, more important, such a depiction of the colon ' s condi-
tion was self-serving: it reinforced a heroic self-image while allowing the 
colons to indulge in an even greater self-deception. 
A more objective analysis, of which the colons were incapable, might 
have suggested that the winds of imperialism had warped and stunted these 
French "oaks" and that, had the agricultural efforts been more successful, 
the sinking of their twisted roots into the soil of Tonkin would have drawn 
sustenance away from the bamboo forest just as effectively as the exac-
tions of the bureaucrats. Nothing better indicates the basic thrust of colon 
attitudes than their views on colonial legal practices. They insisted on 
defining justice as the protection and extension of their own interests to the 
exclusion of all other interests. Their most immediate complaints centered 
on the difficulties involved in litigation with Vietnamese sharecroppers who 
defaulted on the advances made to them. The colons believed that the 
costs of such legal action nullified its effectiveness. 42 One commentator 
estimated that costs in a case involving a claim of 160 francs against a 
defaulting sharecropper ran as high as 95.42 francs. 43 Another colon ex-
plained that, if the disputes between planters and sharecroppers were 
seldom that important in themselves, the sheer number of these conflicts 
posed serious problems: were a colon to seek legal redress in each case, 
he might have to travel one hundred to one hundred and fifty kilometres 
each time, only to discover often enough that appeal to the law could 
achieve little for him. 44 The colons charged, in brief, that the legal system 
did not answer to their economic needs. 
They, however, did not leave the matter there. In their view, colonial 
legal structures and practices ranked with the neglect of agriculture and 
the tax program as gross errors made by misguided and incompetent fellow 
imperialists. As legal institutions and procedures changed in time , so too 
did colon criticism of their details. Yet the main lines of criticism remained 
constant. The colons had no wish to be judged by native mandarins, about 
whom they remained ambivalent. 45 At the same time they had scant re-
spect for French magistrates and legal officials. The centralizing tendencies 
41 Ibid. 
4 2 
"Syndicat des Planteurs du Tonkin," ibid., 21 April 1901, pp. 3-4, p. 3. 
43 
" La colonisation agricole et Ia justice au Tonkin," La Quinzaine coloniale, 
25 July 1905, pp. 449-50. 
44 Eugene DucHEMIN, "La colonisation agricole au Tonkin," Revue lndo-Chinoise, 
24 November 1902, pp. 1095-1102, 1099-97. 
45 P. THOME, " Note sur les Rapports des Colons Agriculteurs avec I' Adminis-
tration indigene," A venir du Tonkin, 9 May 1896, p. 3 ; Jean o 'ANNAM, " Justice pro-
vinciale ," ibid. , 30 November 1905, p. I ; L. DES CHARMETTES, " Le peine de mort et 
les assesseurs indigenes," ibid ., February 17, 1906, p. I. 
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of the magistrates disturbed them. 46 They also attacked the organization of 
the colonial judicial service, which often enough did send its magistrates 
scurrying from one end of the empire to the other. Prolonged residence in 
a single area, of course, would have better allowed the magistrates to be-
come familiar with indigenous customs and language, but the colons trans-
formed a valid point in an all too characteristic fashion: "When one 
brings to the bar a Frenchman, a Dahomean and a Vietnamese, all guilty of 
the same offense, he (the magistrate) must know how to distinguish the 
man from the savage, and the savage from the malevolent monkey." 47 
Apparently incapable of making such distinctions, the magistrates commit-
ted what the colons could only regard as crime: ' 'There seems to reign in 
the colonial magistrature, as presently composed, a tendency to favor the 
native against the Frenchman. " "8 The case of a M. Testard confirmed their 
fears about the judicial service. Testard had attacked and wounded a Viet-
namese who allegedly had cried. "All Frenchmen are pigs ." During the 
course of this former soldier's second trial the prosecuter, aM. Levy, dar-
ed to refer to Testard as "cowardly." Testard received a suspended sen-
tence of twenty-four hours in prison, an excessive penalty in colon eyes, 
and, refusing to forgive Levy's characterization of him, one of their publi-
cists gratuitously dragged into the A venir du Tonkin a rhapsody on how 
French soldiers treated Jews in Algeria. 49 
French justice provoked other charges. Objectively, it may have 
made little sense to require Vietnamese participants in French judicial pro-
ceedings to swear the proper French oath, but colon ridicule of the require-
ment possessed distinct tones of its own: "After having subjected the 
natives to the justice of regular French tribunals, certainly' one of the most 
stupidities committed here is administering to the Vietnamese, morally and 
physically degenerate people, the solemn oath of honest, free , educated 
generous men." 5° Continuing along the same lines, this critic posed 
a question: "Would it not be more rational to administer to monkeys the 
oaths of monkeys, and to Europeans their own oaths" 51 He concluded: 
" to administer our oath to the Vietnamese, who are absolutely incapable 
of comprehending grandeur and sanctity ... is to serve strawberries in cham-
pagne to swine.'' 52 The concern with distinctions between the colonizers 
and the colonized also emerged in the protest against Europeans , charged 
with or convicted of crimes , being taken publically through the streets of 
Hanoi, for this practice allegedly exposed all Europeans to Vietnamese rid-
icule. 53 Indeed , for the same reason, the colons wanted Vietnamese spec-
tators excluded from judicial proceedings involving Europeans. 54 They 
46 VIDEO, ''La Justice au Tonkin," ibid., 21 March 1896, p. I ; VIDEO, "La 
Justice fran~aise et les Indigenes," ibid., II April 1896, p. I. , 
47 M.N., " Magistrats Coloniaux ," ibid ., 2 October 1897, p. I. 
48 Paul DE VAREILLES, " Jury ," ibid., 23 September 1896, p. I. 
49 MoNES, "Tous Fran~ais," ibid. , 10 February 1897, pp. 2-3 , p. 3. 
so M.N., " Le Serment," Ibid ., 9 June 1897, p. I. 
51 Ibid. 
5 2 Ibid. 
53 " Cour criminelle du Tonkin ," ibid., 31 March 1900, p. I. 
s4 B., UJoli Resultat ," ibid. , 2 December 1900, p. I. 
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would also have liked to remove native interpreters from cases pitting Eu-
ropeans and Vietnamese against each other. Having defined interpretation 
as "grand and ... noble" work, they decided that it required "knowledge 
and qualities hard to find in an Asiatic.'' 55 Momentarily forgetting their op-
position to the multiplication of European personnel, they suggested the 
creation of "a corps of European interpreters" like that which existed in 
Algeria. 56 
An insistence on repression runs through colon ruminations on the 
law. They wanted the French code to provide harsher punishments and re-
gretted the inclination of the judiciary to dispense with the death penalty. 57 
Hence, they greeted the wave of repression unleashed by Sarraut after the 
1913 bombing incident with delight. 58 On the whole, however, the colons 
believed French law to be insufficiently rigourous. They welcomed, there-
fore, those occasions when their compatriots took the law into their own 
hands. 59 More significantly, dissatisfaction with French legal procedures 
led the colons to discover initially unsuspected virtues in traditional Viet- . 
namese legal practice. Among its merits could be counted the principle of 
collective responsibility. 60 Traditional corporal punishments appealed to 
them even more: the colons argued that, not only did the Vietnamese un-
derstand sucb penalties better than prison, but that they actually prefered 
them, for prison sentences deprived their families of support. 61 The latter 
point may have had some limited validity, but the colons chose to rest their 
case on the nature of Vietnamese character: "The Vietnamese, essentially 
a liar, lacking moral sense, has no concept of honor such as we understand 
it. A penal condemnation brings him no sense of shame. Only corporal 
punishment acts directly on the native's mind." 62 Expressed in a variety 
of forms, the refrain remained the same: "The yellow's mentality is made 
in such a way that he only respects what he fears." 63 
The climate of colon opinion, most clearly expressed in attitudes to-
ward the law, brought them into the battle being waged in France between 
the proponents of Assimilation and the increasingly powerful advocates of 
Association. 64 Hardly sophisticated ideologues themselves, the colons ap-
propriated the arguments of metropolitan theorists to justify positions they 
55 
"Les interpretes pres les tribunaux," ibid., 18 August 1899, p. I. 
56 Ibid., See also B., "Une Plaie," ibid., 25 July 1900, p. I. 
57 LtSBETH G., "Justice et Securite," ibid., 24 November 1899, p. I; A.B., 
"Meurtre d'un Europeen a Ninh-Binh," ibid., 12 August 1900, p. I; Paul XEM, "Repres-
sion en Indo-Chine," ibid., 6-7 November 1905, p. I; L. DES CHARMETTES, ibid., 17 
February 1906, p. I. 
58 Henri LAUMONJER, "Pour Ia paix publique," ibid., 19-20 May 1913, p. I. 
59 Paul HtsSEMANN, "Cambrioleurs et Assassins," ibid. , II July 1906, p. I. 
60 LISBETH G., ibid., 24 November 1899, p. I. 
61 E. DE RtNXANAts, "Opinions: La Justice en Indo-Chine," ibid., 21-22 1906, 
p. I ; Henri LAUMONIER, "Peines corporelles," ibid., 
62 X., "Suppression des peines corporelles," ibid., 24 November 1901, p. I. 
63 Henri LAUMONIER, "Justice et Fermete," ibid. , I January 1905, p. I. 
64 For a general treatment of these theories during this period, see Raymond 
F. BETTS, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1%1). 
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had already reached on their own. But they threw themselves into the 
struggle with gusto. The Assimilationists, of course, constituted the enemy. 
These misguided spirits continued to cling to the mistaken idea of racial 
equality. 63 From the defects of the legal system to the 1913 bombing inci-
dent, Assimilation could be blamed for much of what had gone wrong in 
Tonkin. 66 The theorists of Association, men like L. de Saussure and Gus-
tave Le Bon, with their stress on racial differences, made far more sense 
to the colons. 67 Yet, as the colons learned, Association could be interpret-
ed in more than one fashion. They would come to complain: "Les Com-
bes et _les Pelle tan export jetsam to Indochina, the Vietnamese pays to 
m~intain these people, and that is called Association.'' 68 But behind such 
a self-satisfying fusion of concern for the Vietnamese with political preju-
dice lurked a more fundamental question: "Will there be a policy of Asso-
ciation for the colon as there is for the Vietnamese?" 69 
Etienne Clementel, a member of the second and third Rouvier cabi-
nets (January 1905 - March 1906), became the first Minister of Colonies 
to call publically for the implementation of Association. Either because it 
had become so accustomed to the contrary tendency or because of some 
more mundane error, the Avenir du Tonkin initially portrayed him as de-
manding Assimilation. 70 The correction of this mistake, however, did not 
make the colons any fonder of Clementel. In general they disliked Minis-
ters of Colonies: to take but two cases, they charged Trouillot, one of the 
several Colonial Ministers of the Meline ministry (April 1896- June 1898), 
with managing to destroy the work of ten years in three months, and they 
dismissed Millies-Lacroix, who became Minister of Colonies in the Cle-
menceau ministry (October 1906- July 1909), because he had never given 
any -thought to the colonies before assuming the ministry and, perhaps 
more significantly, for being "too much the perfect bourgeois to be a good 
colonial." 71 But Clementel especially enraged the colons. He arrived at 
his ministerial post as metropolitan criticism of the colon attitudes towards 
the Vietnamese mounted as a result of the sobering Russo-Japanese War, 
and, in response to such criticism, he dared to project a visit to Indochi-
na in order to organize the defences of France's Far Eastern possession 
65 B., "De l'egalite des races," Avenir du Tonkin, 14 January 1900, p. I. 
66 E. DE R!NXANAIS, ibid 21-22 May 1906, p. I; Albert DE PouvouRVILLE, "Les 
Dangers de I'Enseignement Fran"ais en Asie (suite et fin)," ibid., 27 August 1913, pp. 
2-3, p. 2. 
67 G.M. , "Psychologie et Assimilation," ibid., 15-16 May 1899, pp. 1-2; B., 
"L'Esprit d'Association," ibid., 15 September 1900, p. I; B., "Les Civilisateurs," ibid., 
I November 1900, p. I; G., "Assimilation a outrance," ibid., 17-18 December 1900. The 
colons had much less use for another theorist of Association, Jules Harmand. He had 
served in Tonkin, and the dislike was mutual. VIATOR, "Bas, les Masques," ibid ., 12 
November 1905, p. I; Jules HARMAND, Domination et colonisation (Paris: Ernest Flam-
marion, 1919), pp. 103-04, 123-25, 131-32, 139, 141-42. 
68 L. BoNNAFONT, "Les mots vides," ibid., 20 October 1905, p. I. 
69 Paul XEM, "Curieux Pays (II)," 24 March 1906, p. I. 
70 Alf. Meynard, "Politique nouvelle," ibid., 15-16 May 1905. p. I. 
71 
"Une Ministre de 3 mois," ibid ., 3 November 1898, p. I; MAT-Gioi, "La Po-
litique Coloniale du Nouveau Ministre," ibid., I December 1906, p. I; MATGIOI. "La 
Marche a Ia Justice," ibid., 8 February 1907, p. I. 
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and to settle "the differences which exist between the colons and the na-
tives." 72 The colons hardly considered a Minister of Colonies to be a fit 
judge of their affairs. Their invective, consequently, reached new depths: 
they painted "Nguyen van Kelementele" as the "partisan of association 
and the victim of disassociation." 73 They offered their own explanation of 
the source of his delusions: "On account of resting amourously on a small 
neo-cohinchinese breast, M. Clementel has thought to divine the aspira-
tions of the Vietnamese soul." 74 The latter effort disturbed the colons 
more than the former. For them. the real problem with Clementel's policy 
lay in his interpretation of Association: "Under the coloring of Associa-
tion, we raise the Yellows, we lower the Whites." 75 
The colons received another shock when Georges Clemenceau, who 
had opposed Jules Ferry's acquisition of Tonkin years before, came to 
power in 1906. The Avenir du Tonkin published an impressive catalogue of 
his anti-imperialist activities - a call for the abandonment of Corsica in 
1871, an attack upon French rights in Egypt in 1877, opposition to the in-
tervention in Tunisia in 1881, the blocking of French cooperation with the 
British in the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, the obstruction of ac-
tion in regard to Madagascar in 1885 and, of course, his role in bringing 
Ferry down in 1885 - before it posed the question of on whose behalf 
he worked. 76 Having managed to suggest that he acted as a British agent, 
the colon journal did not overlook his entanglement in the Panama scan-
dal. 77 But Clemenceau resembled William Gladstone in at least one impor-
tant respect: willing to denounce colonial acquisitions when out of power, 
neither statesman showed himself inclined to renounce them when holding 
office. By 1906 Clemenceau could not be ranked among the active anti-
imperialists, a group upon which the colons expended remarkably little ve-
nom. The Clemenceau ministry appeared to the colons to pose a more sub-
tle threat than aggressive anti-imperialism. They expected it to pursue an 
African course: " ... it is good taste in M. Clemenceau's entourage to play 
at being the African and to forget Tonkin." 78 Having little use for Clemen-
ceau's Minister of Colonies, Millies-Lacroix, the colons found what com-
fort they could in the notion that France would have its real Colonial Min-
ister in Stephen Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 79 
Politicians, the "barnums politiques," could create real problems for 
the colons. 80 But colonial affairs seldom occupied the center of the Third 
72 Henri LAUMONIER, ibid ., 20 April 1905 , p. I. 
73 Paul XEM, "Curieux Pays!, " ibid., 19-20 March 1906, p. I; EoGI, " Un fac-
tum," ibid .. 19-20 February 1906, p. I. 
74 Henri LAUMONIER, "Hola! Doucement done!," ibid ., 24 November 1905, p. I. 
75 Ibid. 
76 The author mistakenly put the bombardment of Alexandria in 1883 . Jean 
o'ANNAM, "Les mots fetiches (III) , Le Bloc ," ibid. , 27 December 1906, p. 
77 Ibid. 
78 MATGIOI, ibid., 8 February 1907, p. I. The appearance of Onesime RECLus' 
Liichons I'Asie, Prenons /'Afrique (Paris: Librairie universelle , 1904) had increased colon 
sensitivity to the dangers of an African orientation within the imperialist movement. 
7 9 MATGIOI , Avenir du Tonkin, 8 February 1907, p. I. 
80 LE PLEBEIEN, "Politique d'association par irrigation," ibid., 25 March 1906, 
p. I. 
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Republic's political stage. In order to weild some influence in France, the 
colons had to work with and through the metropolitan business communi-
ties possessed of a stake in empire and the colonial lobbies patronized by 
these communities. 81 On occasion the colons mobilized the support of 
these metropolitan groups, but more often, at best, the contradictions 
within the imperialist movement made relations difficult and, at worst; 
colon views and activities alienated the more powerful of the metropolitan 
imperialists. Like other French colonials, Tonkin's colons suffered from 
and protested against the neo-mercantilist orientation of the mother-
country's tariff policy. 82 In their opposition to the tariff structure they 
were at one with such metropolitan free traders as the Lyonnais Ulysse 
Pila, the man sometimes described as the real "viceroy" of Indochina, 
but at the same time they attacked his Magasins generaux de Haiphong as 
monopolistic and accused the Pila family of manipulating Haiphong's 
Chamber of Commerce on behalf of its own interests. 83 Possible conflicts 
of interest led to other ambivalent reactions: the colons, for instance, at-
tacked French banks for investing in Siberia at a time when Upper Tonkin 
stood ready for development, but they also feared large scale investment in 
Tonkinse agriculture. 84 
Essentially little men caught up in a larger, menacing economic world, 
the colons struggled to survive and to prosper in that world. Far more suc-
cessful in surviving than in prospering, they nursed all the rancours felt 
by men, engaged in an active life thousands of miles from France, for the 
colonial rentier comfortably ensconced in metropolitan · cities like Paris, 
Marseille and Lyon. The issue of the awarding of decorations and ranks 
in the Legion of Honor to metropolitan imperialists became a veritable ob-
session with the colons : in their perspective, the parasites bathed in glory 
while the true heroes went unrewarded. 85 The government often provided 
these honors in connection with the Colonial Expositions held in France, 
undertakings which the colons considered excessively expensive and total-
81 For a discussion of the importance of the bl!siness commumtles, see John 
F. LAFFEY, "Municipal Imperialism in Nineteenth Century France," Historical Refiec-
tions/Refiexions historiques, I (June, 1974), 81-114. 
82 Ch. COURRET, "Tyrannie rouennaise," Avenir du Tonkin, 18 October 1890, p. I. 
83 "Les Magasins generaux," ibid., 25 August 1888, p. I; Ch. CouRRET, "Sim-
ple true," ibid., 21 March 1891, p. I. Despite such criticism, Pita did intervene with 
Governors General on behalf of agrarian development. See John F. LAFFEY, "Les raci-
nes de I'imperialisme fran~ais en Extreme-Orient," Revue d'histoire moderne et con-
temporaine, XVI (April-June, 1969): 282-99, p. 293; and John F. LAFFEY, "Municipal 
Imperialism in France: The Lyon Chamber of Commerce, 1900-1914," Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society, 119, (February, 1975): 8-23, p. 20. For the des-
cription of Pita as "viceroy," see Joseph BUTTINGER, Vietnam, A Dragon Embattled, I 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 546. 
84 Louis RAYMOND, "Un Espoir," Avenir du Tonkin, 7 March 1896, p. I; M.N., 
"De Ia colonisation (4e article), ibid., 14-15 November 1898, p. I; Paul DE VAREILLES, 
"Compagnie de colonisation," ibid ., 9 December 1898, p. I. 
ss B .. "A propos de decorations et de rubans." ibid .. 15 June 1900, p. I; CAS-
SANDRE. "L'Exposition Coloniale de Marseille," ibid., 2 March 1905, p. I; Henri LAu-
MONIER, "Satisfactions morales," ibid., 24-25 February 1913, p. I; Henri LAUMONIER, 
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ly useless. 86 The Marseille Exposition of 1906 especially infuriated them 
Here one of the most sacred of colon taboos had been violated: ''The sad-
dest part is that the metropolitans' habitual frivolity has produced a de-
plorable effect on the natives sent there. Never have French women given 
proof -of such indecency ... " 87 But neither sexual fear, a common accom-
paniment of racism, nor the thwarted mania for decorations prevented the 
colons from grasping some of the real dynamics of French imperialism, 
and hence they occasionally sounded like social radicals. The Avenir du 
Tonkin, reflecting upon Victor Augagneur' s move from the mayoralty of 
Lyon to the Governor Generalship of Madagascar, charged with more than 
a little truth: " ... it is not a man, it is a city that one names Governor 
General, it is Lyon that, through the influence of its great industry, has 
bent the interests of policy in favor of the interest of its capitalists." 88 
Up to a point the major metropolitan imperialist organizations, bodies 
tied to groups like the Lyonnais capitalists, tolerated the colons . These or-
ganizations, after all, had a stake in maintaining that all went well or at 
least could go well within the empire. Both the Comite de l' Asie franraise 
and the Union Coloniale devoted attention to instances of colon success 
in Tonkin. 89 But both organizations also proved willing to discuss the need 
for the colonial government to repurchase the concessions and to distribute 
the lands regained to the Vietnamese. 90 These metropolitan organizations, 
moreover, felt much less constraint than the administrators when they 
came to the consideration of the faults of the colons. The Russo-Japanese 
War convinced them of the need to bring the colons under firmer control. 
Arguing that "reason and sentiment, interest and justice" dictated a 
greater solicitude for the needs of the peoples of the empire as ''the more 
efficacious and the surer way of gaining their sympathies and, consequently, 
their fidelity", Charles Depince warned in the pages of the Union colo-
niale's Quinzaine coloniale that the administrators' efforts to achieve such 
results could be "paralyzed, even thwarted" by the attitudes of the colons 
towards the natives. 91 He singled out Tonkin as the area of the empire 
where expressions of "mistrust and hate" for the natives assumed the most 
constant and violent character. 92 Henri Laumonier, at once a colon and the 
most racist of Tonkin journalists, replied to Depince: "Annamitophobes! 
86 CASSANDRE, ibid, 2 March 1905, p. I ; LAUMONIER, ibid. , March 2, 1913, p. I. 
87 Henri LAUMONIER, "CourTier de Hanoi," ibid 21 February 1907, p. I. 
88 Alf. MEYNARD, "CourTier de Hanoi," ibid., 21 October 1905, p. I. For Lyon-
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parable to that of the Central European Mitre/stand. 
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10 January 1905, pp. 4-5. 91 Ch. DEPINCE, " Annamitophobie, " ibid. , 25 November 
1904, pp. 697-700, p. 697. 
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and why? Because we refuse to play the role of victims, refuse to allow 
ourselves to be pillaged and assassinated." 93 Shortly thereafter the. Bulletin 
du Comite de l' Asie fran~aise carried an announcement of its ''astonish-
ment" and "regret" that an article entitled "La loi de Lynch" had ap-
peared in a Tonkinese journal. 94 The Bulletin went on to charge that "the 
state of mind of our confrere seems to us singularly inopportune and un-
conscious of the nature of the task we have to perform in Indochina." 95 
Laumonier, in reply, pointed out that the cry for lynch law had come after 
the murder of one colon and the acquittal of Vietnamese charged with the 
murder of another and that its espousal, by a single journalist hardly meant 
that Tonkin's press had committed itself to massacre. 96 Returning to his 
polemic against the Quinzaine coloniale, he now argued that its "best col-
laborators are here in ... the government bureaus." 97 Laumonier, in short, 
brought together the colon hatreds for metropolitan imperialist and colonial 
bureaucrats. 
Political sagacity did not distinguish the colons. When they drew up 
a detailed list of complaints and demands in 1906, the Union Coloniale 
flatly rejected two of their most important claims. The Quinzaine colo-
niale dismissed the demand for the creation of representative bodies 
structured along the lines of the Algerian Financial Delegations with the 
observation that the size of the French minority in Indochina did not 
warrant such a course of action. 98 It also rejected the demand for the 
introduction of land legislation modelled on the Australian Torrens Act, 
a move which would have pulverized Vietnamese property patterns, with 
a more telling observation: such legislation would "transform this people 
of small property holders ... into an agricultural propletariat inclined to 
be swayed by all the promptings of misery and social revolt." 99 Yet the 
following year Joseph Chailley, the secretary of the Union Coloniale who 
had expressed his reservations about the colons on several occasions, lent 
their claims some limited support. 100 The colons erred in tending to lump 
all their metropolitan imperialist critics together, for such backing, what-
ever its limitations, underscored the extent to which the imperialist 
establishment still contented itself with calls for the removal of "abuses" 
and refused to think in terms of structural reform within the empire. 
93 Henri LAUMONIER, "Annamitophobie," Avenir du Tonkin, 19 January 1905, p. I. 
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IMPERIALISTS DIVIDED : TONKIN'S COLONS 107 
Harsher critics of the situation in Indochina emerged outside the 
ranks of the imperialist organizations. But most of them, even when 
calling for radical change, remained firmly committed to imperialism. 
Captain Fernand Bernard charged in 1901 that there existed no greater 
danger to French Indochina than the land concession system: "colo-
nization understood in this fashion adds nothing to the wealth of the 
country, it only increases the misery of the Vietnamese." 101 Eleven 
years later J. Morel, a colonial administrator who had served in Tonkin, 
published an academic thesis which revealed the transgressions of the 
colons in all their nakedness. Morel, scarcely an anti-imperialist, worried 
about the land concession becoming "a foyer of anti-French agitation." 102 
Both authors infuriated the colons, but Morel drove them to a greater 
frenzy. 103 Not only did his detailed facts and figures cut much closer 
to the bone, but his thesis, giving rise to dispute even in the Chamber of 
Deputies, appeared at a time of great difficulty for the colons. 104 
During the years immediately before the outbreak of World War I 
the colons confronted challenges which seemed to dwarf those brought 
about by the Russo-Japanese War when the repurchase of the concessions 
had been considered, the metropolitan imperialist organizations had been 
antagonized, and a Minister of Colonies had even considered a visit to 
Indochina. They now had to worry about whether the acquisition of 
Morocco would lead to the neglect of Indochina. 105 They also found 
themselves to be the target of novelists. Paul Adam's La Force and 
Emile Fabre's Les Sauterelles produced the inevitable furious reaction: 
"How do writers ... like Paul Adam and Fabre ... produce these fantasies 
in colonial matters? The doctors of a future neurological congress will 
have to enlighten us on this point of mental pathology." 106 However 
important such works may have been in influencing metropolitan opin-
ion, they expressed rather than created sentiments which menaced the 
colons-. Seen in this light, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Les Sau-
terelles lay in its translation into Vietnamese by a French army officer 
whom the colons promptly described as "a valiant warrior who during his 
sojourn here did not leave the offices of the Conseil de Guerre in 
Hanoi.'' 107 The real threats to the colons emerged from two overlapping 
movements: the concern of military men with strengthening the French 
army through the introduction of more colonial units and the forceful 
expression on the metropolitan political stage, in the Chamber of Deputies, 
of colonial reformist views which, outstripping the caution of the im-
101 Capitaine Fernand BERNARD, L'Indo-Chine. Erreurs et dangers - un pro-
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perialist lobbies, had been growing in strength since the turn of the 
century. 
As the international situation in Europe became more threatening, 
military men became interested in "the France of one hundred millions" 
as a reservoir of man-power. They recognized that changes would have 
to take place in the empire if they were to secure substantial numbers of 
loyal colonial troops. Generals Famin and Pennequin, both of whom had 
served in Tonkin, turned their attention to the situation in Indochina. 
Their views immediately alienated the colons. The Avenir du Tonkin 
accused Famin of having "fallen ... into fashionable eccentricity by doing 
his part in the humanitarian concert." 108 The general had made the utopian 
mistake of wanting the French to make the Vietnamese love them. 109 
Two years later, with the old primitive rebel De Tham stirring once again 
in the uplands, colons and others met in Hanoi to found a Ligue des inte-
rets franrais. This "assembly of 1100 citizens" protested against many of 
the new developments, among them: 
II. . .. the views of General Pennequin, including the most serious: 
" De Tham is a hero worthy of all our admiration, as he has that of the whole 
Vietnamese people ,'' a view which constitutes a justification of assassination, 
theft and piracy. 
III. ... the project of General Pennequin relative to the creation of a 
Vietnamese army which will assure the ruin of French domination in Indo-
china. 110 
A colon spokesman did not hesitate to dip into the past in order to 
discredit the general: understanding the aboriginal peoples better than the 
Vietnamese, Colonel Pennequin had gained his Tonkinese victories in the · 
mountains rather than in the delta region where in May, 1892 the bands 
of Doe Ngu allegedly played with him like a child. 111 The colon reaction 
to the idea of a larger Vietnamese force staffed in some part by Vietnamese 
officers rested upon two perceptions. Although they admitted the 
superiority of the Tonkinese tirailleur in time of war, they discounted 
the dangers of war and hence prefered the militiaman to the tirailleur: 
"While the militiaman ... remains submissive, defers to all the authorities 
and keeps his salutary fear of our code, the tirailleur, because of this 
deracinement ... which makes an individual of him, an individual very 
proud of but very burdened by this unexpected individuality, is an easy 
prey for all the smart talkers and all the fomenters of discords." 112 The 
colon position on Vietnamese officers had a more telling logic of its own: 
" ... either these Vietnamese will be worthy of being French officers ... and 
then their first and most noble concern will be to throw us into the sea. 
Or these people will content themselves with their pay, the honors of 
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their position, the joy of wearing a showy uniform ... and I do not want 
them as officers of the French army.'' 11 3 
Had they not been paralleled by increasing metropolitan interest 
in Indochina, the wishes of the military men would have still roused 
colon ire but also would have produced less real concern. In 1909, 1910 
and 1911 Adolphe Messimy and Maurice Viollette presented colonial 
budget reports to the Chamber of Deputies which described conditions 
in Indochina in scorching terms. With interest in the colony already 
awakened by the Vietnamese attempt in 1908 at poisoning the Hanoi gar-
rison, heated debate took place in the Palais Bourbon, with the Avenir du 
Tonkin being singled out for some special parliamentary attention. 114 
Viollette, a radical colonial reformer and not an anti-imperialist, came 
to carry the burden of the attack on Indochinese conditions in the Chamber 
of Deputies. 115 Having earlier accused "the judeo-masonic Republic" of 
lacking interest in the colonies, the colons now had to cope with colonial 
affairs attracting too much political attention in France. 116 Their hostile 
reactions to this development took a variety of complementary and 
contradictory forms. 
The colons attempted to repair relations with the bureaucrats. This 
course of action entailed forgetting their previous complaints, many of 
which were now repeated by parliamentarians who, on the whole, treated 
the administrators more roughly than the colons. The hierarchy of colon 
hatreds eased an incomplete transition in attitudes. A revenue agent had 
been killed, and during the course of the judicial investigation the president 
of Saigon's criminal court exploded at a witness from that service :"By 
your abuse of powers, by your exactions, by your countless misdeeds, 
you have made the populations hate you, and if some of you have perish~ 
ed, do not be astonished. It is written in the scriptures: 'He who lives 
by the sword will perish by the sword.''' 117 The colons had nurtured similar 
sentiments for years, but they also had always disliked magistrates more 
than administrative agents. They now swept to the defense of these agents. 
The new Ligue des interets fran~ais sought to bring together the fonc-
tionnaires with the colons. If the second and third points of its program 
were- directed against the plans of the military men, the first and fourth 
points were designed to appeal to the bureaucrats : 
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J9J2, p. 5. 
114 Francis de Pressense, Seance du 2 avril J909, Chambre desDeputes, 9e Legis-
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The assembly of 1100 citizens ... 
I. Protests against the injurious and unjust words pronounced by 
councillor Nacquart, president of the Criminal Court of Saigon, and addressed 
to the revenue corps of Indochina, words which constitute an encouragement 
of crime. 
IV . Protests against the nomination of M. Van Vollenhoven [for the 
Secretary Generalship], a nomination which constitutes a scandalous pro-
motion, an act of astonishing favoritism, an act which gives Indochina an 
ambitious administrator, completely ignorant of the country , who affirms a real 
scorn for the public opinion of Indochina, for its needs, and also for the 
competence of administrators who have made their careers in Indochina 
and possess claims which M. Vollenhoven lacks , notably that of belonging 
to families who were French in ages when one fought for France. •u 
Laumonier, however, remained skeptical of the new organization's po-
tential: he pointed out the timidity of private individuals and the un-
willingness of bureaucrats to run the risk of "governmental thunder-
bolts." 119 Undoubtedly, he had some right on his side when he consider-
ed the probable reactions of the bureaucrats, but at the same time old 
emnities could not be easily buried. 
Conspiracy provided a satisfying explanation of the attacks upon the 
colons. In one variation they saw themselves as the sacrificial offerings 
in a plot arranged by the bureaucrats in an attempt to shift responsibility 
for Indochina's problems from their own shoulders, where it belonged, 
to those of the colons. 120 In another version they suggested that a divi-
sion of imperial spoils had taken place in which Eugene Etienne, the noted 
imperialist politician, received Africa and "the patrons of Viollette who 
is only a valet" recei1ved Madagascar and Indochina. 121 Following this 
line of thought and again striking a note of social radicalism, the chief 
spokesman for the A venir du Tonkin posed some pertinent questions: 
"A group like the international consortium of the Yunnan construction 
company, enterprises like Chieze et Menard, have caused, through the 
ferocious rapacity of those who benefit from them, many deaths, while 
impoverishing the colony by carrying millions away from it. Why then do 
our parliamentarians, so ardent in the struggle against humble and defense-
less colons, remains mute when it is a question of fighting these devastating 
''sharks?'' Are there State pardons for the great pirates of finance?'' 122 
A new note of defensiveness appeared. The colons denied that they 
were slave masters out of the pages of Uncle Tom's Cabin. 123 But they 
also unconsciously repeated an argument used by Southern plantation 
owners in the quarrel with Northern abolitionists: "The colons of Ton-
kin... have at all times treated their native auxiliaries with humanity, 
because they know perfectly well that the cooperation of these workers is 
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indispensable to them.'' 124 Carefully excluding any of their number from 
the catalogue , they admitted that nasty incidents did take place: "Because 
a soldier, after drinking, will beat an unfortunate rickshaw coolie, because 
a French woman, already unstrung by the heat, will box the ear of an 
insolent boy, because a police agent , exasperated by a vagabond's silence, 
will thrash him, a small group of metropolitans launches anathemas 
against us." 125 In the colon view, the metropolitan critics , especially 
Viollette, generalized much too quickly from such scattered instances of 
colonial misbehavior. 126 Unfortunately, from the colon perspective, the 
ill-informed criticisms made in the Chamber of Deputies reached Tonkin 
where some Vietnamese interpreted them as an "encouragement to 
sedition." 127 
Confronted with this danger and scarcely inclined by temperament 
to defensiveness, the colons, directing most of their venom against Viol-
lette, "the Hebert of the Third," counter-attacked. 128 The onslaught on 
Viollette eventually slackened. Whatever subsequent recriminations over 
ultimate responsibilities, significant manifestations of unrest from below 
have a marvelous way of leading quarreling groups within a ruling strata 
to compose their differences. The Hanoi bombing incident of April 1913 
paved the way for a truce. Governor General Sarraut, hitherto denounced 
as Viollette's man, won colon support for the ruthlessness of his response 
to the incident. 129 Viollette proclaimed in the Annales Coloniales: "No, 
no policy of weakness." 130 Impressed by this stand, Viollette's most 
severe colon critic acknowledged they shared a common concern with the 
condition of the Vietnamese and appealed to the parliamentarian not to 
judge all colonials in terms of "some brutes," isolated exceptions whose 
existence confirmed the general rule of the sterling qualities of the French 
of Indochina. 131 Differences, of course, remained. Viollette still came in 
for colon criticism. 132 Metropolitan journalists , either having taken the 
temperature of the colon press or remembering Laumonier's untoward 
reference to "citizen Browning," charged their colonial confreres with 
responsibility for the bombing incident. 133 But the crisis had ended. The 
colons returned to their more usual complaints: "The government of the 
Republic has created a Colonial Office, several Colonial Expositions and 
a special Colonial School where function numerous fonctionnaires who 
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cultivate fonctionnaririsme. The government of the Republic calls that 
'colonizing'." 134 
Like other imperialists, Tonkin's colons were insatiable. However 
much they longed for them, the ribbons and crosses of the Legion of 
Honor would not have satisfied the colons. More government concern 
with irrigation would have been appreciated, but it would not have temper-
ed criticism of other facets of colonial policy. Perhaps the granting of 
feudal powers and prerogatives over the land and the indigenous popu-
lations would have quieted them, at least until the inevitable explosion 
which would have led them in turn to more hysterical attacks on the 
offending populations and the government which had allowed them to get 
out of hand. In any event, although the colonial government did a remark-
able amount for the colons, it could not pursue a course of action which 
would interfere with its own powers and its need to extract the revenues 
necessary to meet the charges on its loans. Faced with this check and 
the relative failure of their agrarian undertakings, the frustrated colons 
gave free rein to vilification of their fellow imperialists, in Indochina and in 
France, and to racist ravings. Their hysteria reached fever pitch during 
and immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, when the metropolitan 
imperialists lost patience with them and the government authorities showed 
signs of taking a firmer line, and, even more important, during the years 
immediately before the outbreak of World War I when radical imperial 
reformers subjected colon attitudes and activities to critical scrutiny in 
the Chamber of Deputies. Yet on both occasions, in giving more vehement 
vent to outrage and hatred, the colons only expressed sentiments constant-
ly nurtured in more normal times. 
Little, if anything, can be said in extenuation of colon attitudes. Yet, 
the consideration of their views of fellow imperialists calls for some shad-
ing. However self-interested colon motives were, their criticisms of the 
bureaucracy were not wholly mistaken. Compared to the crude and gras-
ping colons, the apparently more moderate and certainly more cultivated 
metropolitan imperialists who supported organizations like the Union Colo-
niale and the Co mite de I' Asie franc;aise reaped far more of the profits 
flowing from the exploitation of Tonkin without being subjected, as the co-
lons bitterly noted, to any sweeping criticism from the imperial reformers. 
The colons thrived on self-delusion - hypocrisy alone does not wholly 
explain their declarations of sympathy for the indigenous peoples suffering 
under the harsh burden of taxes, monopolies and corvees and their brutal 
treatment of the same peoples in their discussions of the workings of the 
legal system - but they were not necessarily any more prone to self-
delusion than the Viollettes and the Sarrauts who wished the subject po-
pulations well, worked for reform, and met popular resistance with repres-
sion. Finally, although the colons provided their fellow imperialists with 
ample reason to dislike them, they were never abandoned. Whatever the 
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fissures within the imperialist bloc, its component groups continued to 
constitute a community whose members shared a common stake in domina-
tion and exploitation, a basic solidarity of interest in empire. 
